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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CAROLYN HERBERT McCARVEL,
Case No. 950552-CA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Oral Argument Priority 15

vs.
BLAKE T. HERBERT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decree in a domestic relations
matter. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Are the trial court's findings deficient where the trial

court failed to make any finding on the critical disputed issues
and failed to explain the reason for denying Husband's defenses?
This is an original issue presented to this Court.

Although the

issues presented in this appeal involve discretionary rulings by
the trial court, the trial court is still required to make findings
on all material issues sufficient to show that the decree "follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence."

Butler,

Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating
Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted).

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining

that Wife was not estopped from seeking one-half of the current
equity in the home, where it was undisputed that the parties had
agreed to some modification of the divorce decree, Husband made
improvements to the home in reliance upon his understanding that
Wife did not claim any of the increased equity, and Wife did not
respond to letters which confirmed that belief?
reviewed

for abuse of discretion.

Trolley

Square Assocs. v.

Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
raised in Husband's answer
memorandum.
3.

This issue is

This issue was

(R. 61 f 9) and in Husband's trial

(R. 134-130.l)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining

that Wife's claims were not barred by laches, where Wife waited
over five years before bringing her claim for part of the equity in
the home and where Husband had made improvements to the home in
reliance on his understanding, which had been clearly communicated
to Wife, that he would only be obligated to pay the remaining
balance of the $10,000.00 provided in the decree of divorce?
issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Papanikolas Brothers

Enterprises v. Suqarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975).

This

P.2d

This issue was raised below in Husband's

answer (R. 61, f 9 ) , and in Husband's trial memorandum

(R. 127-

126) .

l

The papers in the trial court file are organized in reverse
chronological order, with the result that the record index numbers
for any particular document run in reverse order.
2

4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the

home equity split as of the time of sale or appraisal, where that
unfairly allowed Wife to profit from her own inaction?

The trial

court's adjustment of the parties' property interests is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (citation omitted).
Husband's trial memorandum.

This issue was raised below in

(R. 125-123.)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Husband

is not

aware

of

any

constitutional provisions,

statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is an appeal from a final

decree which amended a prior decree in a domestic relations case.
Only the division of property was at issue.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. The parties

were divorced by decree entered October 21, 1987.

(R. 53-51.) On

September 20, 1994, Wife filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause,
which sought to enforce a provision in the divorce decree requiring
Husband to pay a portion of the home equity to Wife.

(R. 54.) The

trial court issued the requested order to show cause.

(R. 59-58.)

Husband responded to the order to show cause and asserted, among
other things, that Wife's claims were barred by laches, promissory
estoppel and the statute of limitations.
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(R. 62-60.)

A hearing on the order to show cause was held before Judge
Steven L. Hansen on October 27, 1994.

(R. 68-67.)

Judge Hansen

ordered the matter set for a trial before a district court judge.
(Id.)

The case was assigned to Judge Ray M. Harding and set for

trial on April 17, 1995.

(R. 69.)

Following trial, the court

entered its memorandum decision finding the issues in favor of
Wife.

(R. 144-143.)

The court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (R. 148-146) and its Order Amending Decree of
Divorce (R. 151-149) on August 15, 1995.
of appeal on September 13, 1995.

Husband filed his notice

(R. 155-154.)

On October 26, 1995, Wife filed a motion for extension of time
to file a notice of cross-appeal.

(R. 159-158.)

On November 30,

1995, the trial court granted that motion by memorandum decision
(R. 170-169) , and also signed an Order for Extension of Time to
Submit Cross-Appeal which had been submitted to the court by Wife
prior to the court's ruling, and which stated that Wife had ten
days to file her notice of cross-appeal. (R. 172-171.)

Thereafter,

on December 21, 1995, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on the extension of time issues (R. 174173), and a second Order.

(R. 176-175.)

This second Order did not

specify when the notice of appeal should be filed.2

Wife filed her

notice of cross-appeal on January 8, 1996.

2

Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that the maximum extension of time which may be granted by a trial
court is "10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the
motion."
4

C

Statement Of Facts.

The parties were divorced by a

decree entered September 27, 1987.

(R. 53-51.) Two provisions of

the divorce decree give rise to the dispute presently before the
Court:
3.
Each party is hereby ordered to pay
their own debts and Plaintiff is to take
Defendant's name off any credit cards she is
using.

5.
Defendant
is
ordered
to
pay
Plaintiff her equity in the home, namely, Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) within eighteen
(18) months, namely, March 1989. In the event
such amount is not paid, the parties are to
sell the home and the net equity is to be
divided between the parties. Each party is to
sign appropriate documents to sell the home
and each party agrees to fully cooperate in
the selling of such home.
On May 16, 1989, Wife's attorney sent a letter to Husband's
attorney asserting that Husband had failed to make the home equity
payment required by the divorce decree.

(R. 119-118.)

Wife

thereafter had a telephone conversation with Husband regarding the
foregoing provisions of the divorce decree.

(R. 193.)

At that

time, Wife had not complied with her obligation to take Husband's
name off the credit cards and to pay the credit cards (R. 23 0-231,
195-196), nor had Husband paid the $10,000.00.

(R. 193, 220.)

During the telephone conversation, according to Husband, he
offered to pay the credit card bills for Wife, with the amount of
the credit card payments to be offset against the $10,000.00 equity
payment, and she agreed to accept the offset and to allow Husband

5

to pay the balance of the $10,000.00 equity payment to her after he
finished paying off the credit cards.

(R. 220, 228-29.)

Wife

admitted the conversation occurred, but asserted that she only
agreed to allow the offset against whatever equity payment she was
entitled to, i.e, not limited to $10,000.00.

(R. 193, 209.)

On June 5, 1989, apparently following the conversation between
Wife and Husband, Husband sent a letter to his attorney asserting
that the home equity issue had been resolved.

(R. 116.)

Husband's

attorney, in turn, sent a letter to Wife's attorney which stated:
I am informed by Mr. Herbert that he has
contacted his ex-Wife directly and satisfied
the problems in regard to the demands that you
made in your recent letter to me.
If your
understanding is different from this, please
let me know.
(R. 114.)

No response was made to that letter.

(R. 230.)

Over

three years later, on July 21, 1992, Wife sent a letter to Husband
claiming that she was entitled to $25,000.00 as her share of the
equity in the house.

(R. 73.)

Husband responded, through his

attorney, by reminding Wife of the agreement made in 1989, and
inviting Wife to discuss the matters with Husband's attorney.
71-70.)

(R.

Again, Wife did not respond to the letter or make any

further efforts to collect the claimed home equity payment, until
she

filed

proceeding.

her

order

to

show

cause

to

commence

the

current

(R. 213-214.)

Following the 1989 agreement, Husband made all of the payments
on the credit cards.
$6,077.04.

(R. 211.)

(R. 110, 226.)

The total of the payments was

The last payment on the credit cards
6

was made in November, 1994.

(R. 229, 234.) Husband also made all

of the mortgage payments for the house and made improvements to the
home, including installation of a new furnace and air conditioning
system (October 1992 or 1993), and installation of a new front door
and new patio doors (just before trial in April, 1995).
Husband also prepared the home for landscaping.

(R. 223.)

(R. 231.)

cost of the improvements was approximately $6,000.00.

The

(Id.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should hold as a matter of law that Wife is
estopped from asserting her claims. Husband, through counsel, sent
letters to Wife setting forth Husband's understanding of the
agreement between the parties.
letters.

Wife failed to respond to the

Based on his belief that his debt to Wife was only

$10,000.00 less credit card payments, Husband made improvements to
the home and failed to make other arrangements to pay the debt
prior to further appreciation of the value of the home.

Wife's

inaction should be held to create an estoppel or to bar her claims
on the grounds of laches.
At a minimum, the Court should remand with directions that the
equity be determined as of July, 1992.

On that date, Husband's

counsel sent a letter to Wife clearly communicating that Husband
believed his only obligation was to pay $10,000.00 less credit card
payments.

Wife did not respond, and following that date, Husband

7

invested at least $6,000.00 in improvements to the home. Also, the
house continued to appreciate in value.
If this Court does not direct judgment in favor of Husband,
the case should be remanded for additional findings.

The trial

court is required to make findings on all material issues in order
to permit appellate review.

The trial court found that the parties

had reached an oral agreement in May, 1989, to modify the payment
requirements of the divorce decree, but failed to make needed
findings concerning the terms of that agreement. The court further
failed to make any findings to support its denial of Husband's
equitable defenses of laches and estoppel.

Remand of this case is

required to permit the trial court to make the required findings.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DECISION.
The need for detailed findings of fact has been repeatedly
emphasized by the Utah appellate courts:
Failure of the trial court to make
findings on all material issues is reversible
error unless the facts in the record are
"clear,
uncontroverted,
and
capable
of
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment."
The findings of fact must show
that the court's judgment or decree "follows
logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence."
The
findings
"should
be
sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
8

which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached."
Butler. Crockett & Welsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 223, 231 (Utah 1995) (quoting Acton v. J.
B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).
The trial court failed to resolve the disputed factual issues
in this case.

The parties agreed that they had a telephone

conversation in May or June, 1989, resulting in an agreement that
Husband was going to pay the credit card payments and that those
payments were to be deducted from whatever he owed Wife.

The

parties disagreed, however, on several important issues. Husband's
recollection, confirmed in a letter to which Wife did not respond,
was that the credit card payments were to be deducted from the
$10,000.00 home equity amount, and that the balance was to be paid
after the credit card payments were finished.

Wife at trial

asserted disagreement as to both the amount of the home equity and
the time for payment.
Resolution of that disputed issue was critical.

If the

Husband's version was accurate, it is difficult to see how the
trial

court's

decision

could

be

sustained.

If

the Wife's

recollection of the initial agreement was accurate, the trial court
should have specifically considered the effect of her failure to
respond to the letters from Husband's attorney on the subject.
The trial court also failed to state its reasons for denying
Husband's claims of estoppel, laches and waiver. The trial court's
memorandum decision does not even address those issues.
9

The

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Wife's counsel
state only:

"The court having reviewed the trial memorandum of the

Defendant and having considered Defendant's argument for estoppel,
waiver,

equitable

doctrine

property, denied the same."

of

laches,

and

valuation

of

the

This cursory finding is insufficient.

Husband argues below that the evidence compels a determination
in his favor. At a minimum, however, the matter should be remanded
to the trial court for entry of findings on the disputed issues, in
order to permit appropriate appellate review.
POINT II
WIFE IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING HALF OF THE
APPRECIATED VALUE OF THE HOME.
This Court outlined the elements of estoppel as follows:
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which
precludes parties from asserting their rights
where their actions render it inequitable to
allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel
requires proof of three elements:
(1) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act
by one party inconsistent with a laterasserted
claim;
(2)
the
other
party's
reasonable action or inaction based on the
first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second
party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate its
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
State ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 893 P.2d

1107

(Utah Ct. App.

1995).
Each of these elements was satisfied in this case.

Although

Wife did not recall receiving some of the letters (R. 212-213),
there was no real dispute that Husband had clearly communicated to
10

Wife or to her attorney that the issues regarding payment for the
home equity had been resolved, and that the total payments Husband
would be required to make would be $10, 000. 00.3

Also undisputed is

that Wife failed to take any effective action to controvert the
clear understanding expressed in Husband's statements.
there was injury to Husband from the inaction.

Finally,

Based on his

assumption that he and Wife had agreed that he would only pay
$10,000.00

less the credit card payments, he continued

making

improvements to the home and, more importantly, made no efforts to
obtain a loan to satisfy the debt to Wife before the property
values increased further.
Even if the initial agreement was as now asserted by Wife,
Wife still had a duty to respond and refute the claims in the
letters

from

appreciating

Husband's
rapidly

counsel.

in value.

The

house

was

apparently

Where Wife knew that Husband

believed that his only debt to Wife was $10,000.00 less the credit
card payments, it was inequitable to allow her to sit idly by and
allow the house to appreciate and to then claim
appreciated

value

of the house.

The trial

court

half

of the

abused

its

discretion by disregarding Husband's claims of estoppel.
POINT III
WIFE'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY LACHES.
Husband's obligation to pay Wife a portion of the equity
matured in March, 1989.

3

Wife did not seek court assistance in

Husband would be willing to pay interest on the $10,000.00.
11

enforcing that claim for five and one-half years.

Wife made one

demand, in May 1989, for payment of the equity, which was promptly
met by Husband negotiating with her for payment of the credit card
debt.

The only other attempt was her letter in July, 1992, which

actually compounded her inaction because she failed to respond to
the letter from Husband's counsel asserting that Husband's total
obligation was $10,000.00, and thereby reinforced Husband's belief
concerning the agreement in 1989. Under these circumstances, the
trial court should have held the claims barred by laches.

Laches

has been defined as follows:
Laches is not mere delay, but delay that
works a disadvantage to another.
To
constitute laches, two elements must be
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the
part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant
owing to such lack of diligence.
Although
lapse of time is an essential part of laches,
the length of time must depend upon the
circumstances of each case, for the propriety
of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon
the gravity of the prejudice suffered by
defendant and the length of plaintiff's delay.
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Suaarhouse Shopping Center
Associates. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975).
Husband satisfies these elements. There was obviously a lack
of diligence by Wife.

Her excuses for her lack of diligence were

feelings of guilt4 and her non-pushy personalty.

(R. 202.)

Wife

offered no other evidence to controvert the claim of laches. While
persons are certainly not required to be litigious, Wife should
4

She did not explain why she felt guilty for seeking more than
$10,000 in home equity.
12

have, at a minimum, responded to the July, 1992, letter from
Husband's attorney.
The trial court apparently based its determination on the fact
that, had Husband paid the $10,000.00 to Wife in March, 1989, Wife
could have paid the credit card debts. That may be true, but it is
really irrelevant to the issue of whether Wife was guilty of
laches.

There is no evidence that Husband had the ability to pay

$10,000.00 in March, 1989.

From the minimal payments he made on

the high-interest credit card obligations, one would assume that he
did not have an ability to make that payment. More importantly, if
the agreement was as Husband understood it to be, he had no reason
to make the payment. Husband's understanding of the agreement was
that the balance of $10,000.00 was not due until he had finished
paying on the credit cards.

Had Wife not been sitting on her

rights, Husband likely would have taken different actions.

He

would not, for example, have contributed $6,000.00 to improvements
on the house.

By delaying to take any action when she reasonably

should have known that Husband believed that his total obligation
was $10,000.00, Wife has been guilty of laches. This Court should
remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to dismiss
Wife's claims on the grounds of laches.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE HOME
TO BE VALUED AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING.
The trial court's order grants Wife the full benefit of all
appreciation in the home, by ordering that the home be sold or
13

appraised, and that she receive half of the equity at the time of
sale or appraisal, less certain specified offsets for the Husband's
credit card payments and mortgage payments.

This unfairly rewards

Wife for her inaction. Husband argued in his trial memorandum that
the equity in the home should be split as of March, 1989.

Such a

ruling would be appropriate based on the agreement between the
parties.

At a minimum, however, the Court should order that the

equity be determined as of July, 1992.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the parties
made an oral agreement to modify certain payment
specified

in

their

decree

of

divorce.

Husband

requirements
believed

the

agreement to be that his total debt was $10,000.00 less the credit
card payments, and it is undisputed that Wife knew or should have
known that such was Husband's belief, at least by July, 1992. This
Court should hold that Wife's claim for one-half of the current
equity

is barred by her laches, or that she is estopped

from

asserting the claim by her failure to respond to the letters from
Husband's attorney.

Alternatively, the Court should remand this

matter for adequate findings on the disputed issues.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1996.

~ - ^ ~ ^ ^ ^

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: /J
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN-7
Attorneys for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 22nd
day of March, 1996.
Dana D. Burrows, Esq.
387 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
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APPENDK "A"
Decree of Divorce (R. 53-51)

'-'»;?/

=,,.'

RONALD R. STANGER #3074
Attorney for Plaintiff
80 East 100 North
P. 0. Box 477
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 375-5010
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HERBERT,
Plaintiff,

/DECREE OF DIVORCE • "

vs.

BLAKE T. HERBERT,
Defendant.

Civil No. CV 87 264
/

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for
h e a r i n g before the Court on the 21st day of September, 1987
before the Honorable Ray M. Harding.

P l a i n t i f f was present and

r e p r e s e n t e d by Ronald R. S t a n g e r , Derendant was p r e s e n t and
r e p r e s e n t e d by Don R. P e t e r s e n .

P l a i n t i f f moved for an Order

amending the grounds in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to a l l e g e
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s as grounds for such d i v o r c e .
Court granted such motion.

The

The Court also heard a S t i p u l a t i o n

e n t e r e d i n t o between the p a r t i e s and the Court approved such
Stipulation.

The Court having heard evidence and

having

considered the s t i p u l a t i o n e n t e r e d i n t o by the p a r t i e s and

1

000

053

having made in writing its Findings of Fact ana Conclusions of
Law and being fully advised in the premises;
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce

from and against the Defendant, the same to become final upon
the signing and entry in the Registry of Actions.
2.

No alimony is to be awarded.

3. Each party is hereby ordered to pay their own debts
ana Plaintiff is to take Defendant's name off of any credit
cards she is using.
4.

Each party is awarded the life insurance policy

presently in their respective names.
5.

Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff her equity in

the home, namely, Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) within
eighteen (18) months, namely, March 1989. In the event such
amount is not paid, the parties are to sell the home and the
net equity is to be divided between the parties.

Each party is

to sign appropriate documents to sell the home and each party
agrees to fully cooperate in the selling of such home.
6. Plaintiff is to be awarded the following items of
personal property:
1974 Ford Torino Elite
Gray couch purchased in 1986
Sewing machine
Cedar chest
2

000

Personal pictures
Clothing
China
7.

Each p a r t y i s o r d e r e d

t o pay t h e i r own a t t o r n e y

f e e s and c o s t s i nicurrecc u r r e d in
in tchmi ss u araatter.
tcer.
'QJ*-£'_ day o f £ / & r £ * ~ ~ ~ '
DATED t hiis
:
1987.
BY THE-TOUR

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DON R. PETERSEN
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I I

I I

H I '

•

• '

•

II

• I I 1^1

I

I

I

•

••

I

II

Delivered a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce

postage prepaid,
t h i s __j£j?r_L_ d a v o f
, 1987 t o t h e o f f i c e of Don R. P e t e r s e n ,

an^envelope,
jptfAlh
Attorney
Provo, UT

for

in

Defendant,

120 E a s t 300 N o r t h ,

84603.

~^

Secretary

P. 0. Box 7 7 8 ,

APPENDIX "B"

Memorandum Decision (R. 144-143)

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, Stets of Utah

CARMA Bj/SMITH, Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HERBERT McCARVEL,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 87 264
DATE: May 12, 1995

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING

BLAKE T. HERBERT,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling after hearing held in this matter on April
17, 1995. Having received and considered the testimony and evidence presented in this
matter, the Court finds as follows:
The parties were divorced in 1987. Pursuant to the divorce decree entered in this
matter, each party was to "pay their own debts and Plaintiff is to take Defendant's name off of
any credit card she is using." Also, Defendant was ordered to "pay Plaintiff her equity in the
home, namely, Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) within eighteen months, namely March, 1989.
In the event such amount is not paid, the parties are to sell the home and the net equity is to
be divided between the parties."
By May of 1989, Plaintiff had not paid off the credit cards, nor had Defendant paid
Plaintiff the $10,000.
Both parties admit that the decree was modified by them in May of 1989 in that they
agreed that Defendant would pay off the credit card debt for Plaintiff although they disagree
whether this payment would be offset against the $10,000 as Defendant suggests, or against
what "he owed her," according to Plaintiff.
The Court finds that had Defendant paid Plaintiff her $10,000 equity in the home by
March of 1989, Plaintiff could likely have paid her credit cards. By delaying the payment of

000
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the $10,000 equity, Defendant has caused his own undoing. Defendant had the use of the
premises, and the benefit of retaining the use of the $10,000, while only making payments on
the high interest credit cards, which would require the equivalent of her paying the interest on
the debt since 1987.

Yet Defendant desires to hold Plaintiff to a non-inflationary total

amount while receiving the benefit himself of the rise in land values.
Therefore, the Court finds in equity that Plaintiff is entitled to have the home sold and
the net equity divided between the parties. Defendant may however, take an offset before
division of the equity, for mortgage payments he has made since entry of the decree, as well
as a credit of $6,000 for improvements he has made to the property. After an equal division
of the remaining equity, Defendant may take an additional offset in the amount of $6,077.04,
the amount of credit card payments he made.
Should Defendant desire to buy out Plaintiffs equity in the home rather than having it
sold he has that right. To do so, the property must be appraised by a mutually agreed upon
appraiser, if the parties cannot agree on an appraiser, the Court will appoint one. Defendant
must then exercise his right to buy out Plaintiffs interest in the equity of the home within 60
days of that appraisal.
Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees in this matter.
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until
such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 12th day of May, 1995.

cc:

Don R. Petersen, Esq.
Dana D. Burrows, Esq.

r\ * r\

APPENDIX "C

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 148-145)

DANA D. BURROWS - 5045
Attorney for Plaintiff
387 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HERBERT (McCARVEL)
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
:

BLAKE T. HERBERT,
Defendant.

:
Civil No. 87 264
Judge Ray M. Harding

:

The above-entitled matiter having come before the Court for
trial on issues certified to Judge Harding on April 17, 1995.
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows.
Defendant was present and represented by counsel Don K Petersen.
The Court having entertained the argument of counsel and testimony
of the parties as well as affidavits of attorneysf

fees and

memorandum i egai di ng property settlement dnd being fully advised
the premises, and having issued a Memorandum Decision dated May 12,
1995, now, therefore, the Court now enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

.nv:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.
— • 2.

The parties were divorced in 1987.
Pursuant in the Divorce Decree eat ei:ed in tint; niat.ter,

each party was to pay their own debts and Plaintiff was to take
Defendants name off of any credit card she used. Also, Defendant

1

000

was ordered to pay Plaintiff her equity in the home in the amount
of $10,000 within eighteen months, namely by March 1989.

In the

event such amount was not paid, the parties were ordered to sell
the home and the net equity divided between the parties.
3.

By May of 1989, Plaintiff had not paid off the credit

cards nor had Defendant paid Plaintiff the $10,000.
4.

The Decree of Divorce was modified by the parties in May

of 1989 in that they agreed that Defendant would pay off the credit
card debt for Plaintiff although they disagree whether this payment
would be offset against the $10,000 as Defendant suggests, or
against what Plaintiff alleges Defendant owed her.
5.

The Court having reviewed the trial memorandum of the

Defendant and having considered Defendant's argument for estoppel,
waiver, equitable

doctrine

of

laches, and valuation

of

the

property, denied the same.
6.

The Court finds that had Defendant paid Plaintiff her

$10,000 equity in the home by March of 1989, Plaintiff could likely
have paid her credit cards. By delaying the payment of the $10,000
equity, Defendant has caused his own undoing.

Defendant had the

use of the premises and the benefit of retaining the use of the
$10,000 while only making payments on the high interest credit
cards, which would require the equivalent of her payment the
interest on the debt since 1987.

Yet Defendant desires to hold

Plaintiff to a non-inflationary total amount while receiving the
benefit himself of the rise in land values.
7.

Therefore, the Court finds in equity that Plaintiff is
2

000

entitled tc have the home sold and the net equity divided between
the parties.

Defendant may, however, take an offset, before

division of the equity, for mortgage payments he has made since
entry ol the decree as well as a credit of $6,000 for improvements
he has made to the property.

After an equal division of the

remaining equity, Defendant may take an additional offset in the
amount of $6,07 7 ,.04, the amount of credit card payments made
Should Defendant desire to buy out Plaintifff s equity in

8.

the home rather than having it sold, he has that right. To do so,
the property must be appraised by a mutually agreed upon appraiser.
If the parties cannot agree on an appraiser, the Court will appoint
one. Defendant must then exercise his right to buy out Plaintiff's
interest in the equity of the home within 60 days of that
appraisal.
9,

<

- -

responsi bJ e for thed i: own attorney,! s

fees in this matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Coin: t has jurisdiction over the pa rti es :i i:i the

above-entitled matter.
2.

All remaining provisions of the Findings of Fact are

hereby incorporated :i nto the Conclusions of Law.
DATED this /4^

^^^r^95.

day of

JUDBETRAY M. HARDING
Disp~ict Court Judge
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APPROVAL AS TO FORM

Don Petersen
Attorney for Defendant
4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the/foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
O ^
day of
July, 1995.
Don R. Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
DANA D. BURROWS

4
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APPENDIX "D"

Order Amending Decree of Divorce (R. 151-149)

DANA D. BURROWS - 5045
Attorney for Plaintiff
387 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HERBERT (McCARVEL)

ORDER AMENDING DECREE OF
DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
BLAKE T. HERBERT,

Civil No. 87 264
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for
trial

issues certified

Judge Harding on April 17, 1995.

Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows.
Defendant was present and represented by counsel Don R. Petersen.
The '"curt having entei tained the argument of counsel and testimony
of the parties as well as affidavits of attorneys' fees and
memorandum regarding property settlement and being fully advised in
the premises, am I having issued a Memorandum Decision dated May 12,
1995, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1

Pla Intiff is entitled tc: • h a v e the home sol ci and the net

equity divided between the parties. Defendant may, however, take
an offset, before division of the equity, for mortgage payments he
has made since entry of the decree as well as a credit of $6,000
for improvements he has made to the property.

After an equal

000

division of the remaining equity, Defendant may take an additional
offset in the amount of $6,077.04, the amount of credit card
payments made.
2.

Should Defendant desire to buy out Plaintiff's equity in

the home rather than having it sold, he has that right. To do so,
the property must be appraised by a mutually agreed upon appraiser.
If the parties cannot agree on an appraiser, the Court will appoint
one. Defendant must then exercise his right to buy out Plaintiff's
interest in the equity of the home within 60 days of that
appraisal.

Don Petersen
Attorney for Defendant

2

4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this \~7h0 day of
July, 1995.
Don R. Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603

DANA D. BURROWS

3
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AK_JIX"E"
Exhibit A, Letter dated May 16, 1989

R O N A L D R.

STANGER

Attorney and Counselor at Law
UNITED SURETY BUILDING
80 EAST 100 NORTH - P.O. BOX 477
PROVO, UTAH 84603
(801) 375-5010

May 16, 1989

?5*M

Mr. Don R. Petersen
Attorney at Law
120 East 300 North
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
RE

Heroert

vs.

MAY 1 81989

Herbert

HOWARD. LEWIS

PET;

Dear Don:
My c l i e n t , C a r o l y n H e r b e r t , has b r o u g h t t o my a t t e n t i o n t h a t
p a r a g r a p h 5 o f t h e Decree o f D i v o r c e has n o t y e t been c o m p l l e d
with.
Such p a r a g r a p h reads as f o l l o w s :
"5.
Defendant
is
ordered to
pay
Plaintiff
her e q u i t y
in the
home,
namely,
Ten
Thousand
Dollars
($10,000.00)
within
eighteen
(18)
m o n t h s , n a m e l y , March 1989. < In the
e v e n t such amount i s not p a i d ,
the
p a r t i e s a r e t o s e l l t h e home and t h e n e t
e q u i t y i s t o be d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e
parties.
Each
party
is
to
sign
a p p r o p r i a t e d o c u m e n t s t o s e l l t h e home
and each p a r t y a g r e e s t o f u l l y c o o p e r a t e
i n t h e s e l l i n g o f such home. 1 '
Mr. H e r b e r t

has r e f u s e d t o comply w i t h

such

order.

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s l e t t e r i s t o see i f we can a v o i d r u n n i n g
up a d d i t i o n a l a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and see i f y o u c o u l d c h e c k w i t h
y o u r c l i e n t t o see i f he w o u l d be w i l l i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h o u t t h e
necessity of f u r t h e r legal a c t i o n .
I have been i n s t r u c t e a t o f i l e an Order t o Show Cause I n Re:
Contempt.
I h e s i t a t e t o do t h a t t h e r e f o r e , I t h o u g h t i t w o u l d
be more p r o f e s s i o n a l t o w r i t e t o you d i r e c t l y t o see i f we can
a s s i s t our c l i e n t s .
I have c a l l e a you on t h e t e l e p h o n e and i t m i g h t be t h a . t we
have c h a t t e d about t h i s by t h e t i m e you get t h i s l e t t e r .

000
»
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ui;

11 Q

Mr. Petersen
May 16, 1989
Page Two

I would a p p r e c i a t e
convenience.

it

if

you

would c a l l

me a t y o u r

earliest

y,ery / t r u l y _ y o u r s ,

/ / R O N A L D R. STANGER
' ^
A t t / o r n e y at Law
RRS:sw
cc: Carolyn

Herbert

ooo
• -0 0 0
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APPENDIX "F"

Exhibit B, Letter dated June 5, 1989 (R. 116)

looted

tGttaD
JUN 0 81989

r^<- //<f /

H2WARD. LEWIS S PETERSEN

C'/ri /?• fe&Z*£<£*>is^.
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APPENDIX "G"

Exhibit C, Letter dated June 12, 1989 (R. 114)

Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
120 East 300 North Street
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

Jackson Howard
S. Rex Lewis
Don R. Petersen
Craig M. Snyder
John L. Valentine
D. David Lambert
Fred D. Howard
Leslie W. Siaugh
Kevin J. Sutterfieid

Area Code 801
Telephone 373-6345
Teiefax 377-4991
L:S t anger.sr
Our File No. 18,060

June 12, 1989

Mr. Ron Stanger
Attorney at Law
80 East 100 North
P.O. Box 477
Provo, UT 84603
Re:

Herbert v. Herbert

Dear Ron:
I am informed by Mr. Herbert that he has contacted his ex-wife directly and
satisfied the problems in regards to the demands that you made in your recent letter
to me. If your understanding is different from this, please let me know.
Very truly yours,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

Don R. Petersen
DRP/sdr
cc:
Mr. Blake Herbert

000
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APPENDIX "H"

Exhibit F, Letter dated July 31, 1992 (R. 71-70)

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
Post Office Box 778
Provo. Utah 84603

Jackson Ho ware
Don R. Petersen
Craig M. Snvder
John L. Valentine
D. David Lamoert
FredD. Howard
Leslie W. Slaugn

Telephone: (301) 373-3345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991
_.
'* °"

Kevin J. Sutterileid
F. Richards Smith HI
Linda J. Barciav
DanieUe M. Ferron
OF COUNSEL
S. Rex Lewis
Dwignt Flickinger

July 31, 1992

Carolyn McCarvel
1316 East Knollwood Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
Re:

Carolyn McCarvel v. Blake Herbert

Dear Mrs. McCarvel:
Your letter of July 21, 1992 to Mr. Blake T. Herbert has been referred to our office.
I have reviewed your letter, together with the Decree of Divorce, and I am informed that
subsequent to the Decree of Divorce there was an agreement made. Mr. Herbert agreed to pay
for credit card obligations which had been incurred by yourself. These were incurred by way
of a Zions First National Bank VISA Card and a Zions First National Bank MasterCard. The
agreement provided that Mr. Herbert would pay for these accounts, and the amounts that he
paid would be subtracted from the 510,000.00.
Your letter dated July 21st makes no reference to the agreement made with Mr. Herbert.
I note in the file that I received a letter from Mr. Ronald Stanger, who was representing you
at the time of the divorce, making demand for the 510,000. I was informed by Mr. Herbert
in May of 1989 that an agreement had been made and I so informed Mr. Stanger by way of a
letter dated June 12, 1989. I never heard anything further from him.
Mr. Herbert wants to be responsible about this matter and he is willing to pay the
510,000.00 after receiving a credit for payment of the credit card obligations, and credit for
approximately S800.00 by way of checks that he paid directly to you.

000

071

Carolyn McCarvel
July 31, 1992
Page 2

I would appreciate hearing from you, or if you are represented by an attorney, ^I^ie
have your attorney contact me. Mr. Herbert is desirous to resolve this matter without the
necessity of further costs and expenses involved.
Very truly yours,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

DRP:dlp
cc:
Blake T. Herbert
Lmccarve!.Jtr

000
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